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Abstract 
This paper investigates the incremental effects of corporate ownership structure on earnings 
conservatism, examining data of Chinese listed companies. We employ the concept of 
conditional conservatism to define earnings conservatism and adopt empirical models 
developed by Basu (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) to measure the degree of earnings 
conservatism. Our empirical results show that the earnings of companies with higher 
non-tradable shares have lower earnings conservatism. Consistent with prior studies, this 
point demonstrates that the companies with state and concentrated ownership structures are 
more likely to depend on private communication to reduce information asymmetry and to 
resolve agency problems internally, thereby creating a low demand for earnings conservatism. 
The results of this study contribute to our understanding of how companies’ ownership 
structures affect the properties of earnings in emerging markets and post-Communist markets. 
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1. Introduction 
In the 1990s, China launched the Shanghai Stock Exchange and subsequently the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange. Apart from allowing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to obtain foreign 
capital, the purpose of establishing the stock exchanges was to boost the performance of 
SOEs through pressure and accountability in the capital market. However, due to political and 
economic concerns and the possibility of a foreign takeover of local SOEs, the Chinese 
government refused a complete privatization of enterprises and intended to retain its position 
as the proprietor of businesses, in order to seize control of resource allocation within the 
country (Allen et al., 2005). The country presently has some Communist elements and some 
capitalist elements operating under broader Communist Party supervision, and to that extent 
we are largely in uncharted waters. The Slovenian post-Communist philosopher Slavoj Žižek 
(2010) has commented that China’s unique synthesis of capitalism and Communism, rather 
than being unstable, has been a broadly successful experiment that has lasted 30 years. This 
Chinese experiment can be seen as a longer and deeper version of the limited capitalism 
called the New Economic Policy (NEP) that the Marxist revolutionary Vladimir Ilyich Lenin 
introduced to the former Soviet Union in the 1920s to kick-start growth after the civil war.  
 
The Chinese government later devised a “binary equity structure” in which shares are divided 
into two categories: those owned by the government, legal persons and institutions, and those 
owned by investors to be traded in the capital market (Tenev et al., 2002).
1
 The two types of 
shares differ in that the former is not allowed to be publicly traded and its valuation is based 
on the net asset value of an enterprise, whereas that of the latter is based on market value. As 
a result, such a split-share structure allows only one-third of the public companies’ shares to 
be traded in the market, while a majority of the shares is held by the Chinese government. 
Under such circumstances, investors are unable to monitor operations. In the meantime, since 
the board and corporate executives are mostly appointed by the government, their 
management and supervision activities are not aimed specifically at maximizing the earnings 
of owners of tradable shares who have no say in supervision and decision-making processes. 
Dividend payments also depend on holders of non-tradable shares. As a consequence, 
majority shareholders are able to enjoy most of the shareholder rights, despite investing only 
a small amount of capital, while the minority shareholders’ benefits are undermined. 
 
Since non-tradable shares cannot be traded in secondary markets, their prices are based on the 
net asset value of corporations. Transfers of non-tradable shares mostly require the approval 
of the boards of both buying and selling parties, authorities, and other relevant departments 
before contracts are signed to complete the transaction. De Alessi (1974) suggested that since 
equities of SOEs are nontransferable, stock valuation does not reflect corporate value and 
performance. Estrin and Perotin (1991) argued that government, as the proprietor of SOEs, 
does not prioritize profit maximization. Enhancing corporate performance is a secondary goal 
whose importance comes after political and economic ones have been achieved. 
 
                                                        
1 The ultimate controlling owner of state shares is the State Council, but these shares are managed by the local bureau of the 
Ministry of Finance or other central and local government bureaus, as well as SOEs (Green, 2003). 
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This paper investigates the incremental effects of state and concentrated ownership structure 
on earnings conservatism, examining data for Chinese listed companies. We employ the 
concept of “conditional conservatism” to operationalize earnings conservatism. Conditional 
conservatism is defined as the tendency to accelerate losses and defer gains. This 
characteristic of conservatism is referred to in the literature as asymmetric loss recognition 
timeliness (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Beaver and Ryan, 2005; Pae et al., 2005). Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) assert that conditional conservatism, which enhances relevance and 
representational faithfulness, is one of the primary attributes of financial reporting quality in 
capitalist countries. They also contend that conditional conservatism enhances contracting 
efficiency because it makes financial reporting more informative and useful, and thus allows 
stakeholders to monitor a company’s performance better. 
 
Prior research suggests that the demand for earnings conservatism is determined either 
directly or in interaction with managers’ reporting incentives. As discussed above, China’s 
unique corporate ownership structure nevertheless induces agency problems. Meeting the 
demand for earnings conservatism benefits the corporation and its stakeholders because it 
alleviates the agency conflicts (or information asymmetry). This paper maintains that the 
stakeholders’ economic and/or political interests provide important signals about the level of 
earnings conservatism that should be supplied to meet demand. Since China’s government 
holds a majority stake, this concentrated ownership structure typically ignores minority 
shareholders’ demands and places higher reliance upon private forms of communication. 
Therefore, there will be less demand for earnings conservatism in China than in pure 
capitalist economies such as Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, etc (Ball et al., 2000). 
Hence, we posit that the capital structure of higher non-tradable shares, or less proportionate 
outside investor interests, will diminish the demand for prompt disclosure of financial 
information and result in lower earnings quality.  
 
Consistent with Bushman and Piotroski (2006) and LaFond (2005), our overall results 
suggest that Chinese companies with higher non-tradable shares report less earnings 
conservatism. As long as the constraints of dominant government involvement are imposed 
on the market economy, China will not have an infrastructure that encourages capitalist-style 
financial reporting. 
 
This paper provides additional support for discriminating among institutional determinants of 
financial reporting quality. In addition, it adds to the literature by identifying the extent to 
which conditional conservatism has been incorporated into current accounting practice in 
China. In particular, it takes into account the institutional, cultural, and political 
characteristics of a major emerging economy that whilst in the process of guided transition 
from Communism to capitalism has even its capitalist activities monitored and controlled by 
the Communist Party. Our results will have special relevance for other countries in transition 
from Communism to some style of capitalism, whether market- or state-controlled, such as 
Russia, Vietnam, the former Soviet Union republics, and the Eastern European countries. It 
takes a long period of time for social relationships, and expectations in relation to those 
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relationships, to adjust after a number of years of Communism operating in a country 
(Zinoviev, 1985). For example, in the former Soviet Union, Communist social relationships 
and their related expectations did not completely stabilize until as late as the Leonid 
Brezhnev era in the late 1960s and 1970s. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes our 
hypothesis development. The following sections present our research design and sample 
selection process.  We then discuss our empirical evidence. The last section contains a brief 
recap and summarizes the key findings of the study. 
 
2. Hypotheses Development  
2.1 Institutional and Political Influences 
During the course of China’s institutional transformation, the majority of corporations listed 
on China’s stock exchanges are new restructured SOEs that have a distinctive capital 
structure consisting of non-tradable shares and public tradable shares. Due to restrictions on 
public offerings in China, the percentage of shares available in the open market is relatively 
low. In 2003, the proportion of all non-tradable (tradable) shares was 64.45% (35.55%).
2
 
Consequently, a high percentage of non-tradable shares in the typical corporation are 
controlled by a small number of controlling shareholders.
3
  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) claim that privatization improves corporate performance and 
motivates executives. From a political perspective, government officials demanding that 
corporations pursue political and social goals will generate political costs that are borne by 
the SOEs. From a management point of view, the agency costs borne by proprietors and 
managers are manifest in SOEs because shareholders are less motivated to monitor 
executives and the binding mechanism of the market is nonexistent. Complete privatization 
indicates that capital flow rights and voting rights are transferred simultaneously to private 
proprietors, making it difficult for them to discern political and management opinions. 
However, with partial privatization, corporations still are subject to government interference 
as political cost, despite the fact that their shares are traded on the capital market and 
monitored by shareholders.  
 
Political involvement often occurs at the expense of corporate interest, for the purpose of 
achieving political goals. For instance, politicians may abuse their power to transfer some 
corporate resources into the hands of their supporters. From the perspective of agency theory, 
under a corporate governance framework, the equity structure of publicly traded companies 
in China is susceptible to both internal and external moral hazards. Tian and Estrin (2008) 
observe that in China, in times of high profitability, the state is motivated to influence 
corporate profit outcome. 
 
                                                        
2 Based on existing regulations, state and legal person shares held by promoters are not traded in the open market. China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) http://www.csrc.gov.cn/, accessed 19 December 2004. 
3 In 2001, the largest shareholder stake in listed companies averaged 44.9 per cent (Shi and Weisert, 2002), indicating a 
severe concentrated share ownership for Chinese listed companies. 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1998) also propose that equities are better privatized than state-owned, 
because politicians and bureaucrats tend to take advantage of corporate benefits. In other 
words, state proprietorship has a detrimental effect on corporate performance. Megginson and 
Netter (2001) contend that private enterprises outperform their state-owned counterparts, 
saying that corporate performance is found to have improved after privatization. Gupta (2005) 
points out that some privatized companies saw their performance improved thanks to the 
supervisory role that the stock market plays in terms of management. 
 
The continuing government involvement of Chinese listed companies (i.e. the government 
remains a common controlling shareholder) is expected to affect management reporting 
incentives and threaten the transparency of accounting information. Firstly, state ownership 
raises a query about whether financial reporting is and can be based on arm’s-length 
transactions. The lack of separation between ownership and management and close business 
relationships between promoters and listed companies thus presents a conflict of interest and 
raises the possibility of material related-party transactions. Related-party transactions provide 
an easy mechanism for smoothing reported income and reducing financial reporting 
transparency (Fan and Wong, 2002). In addition, officials in control of SOEs are not entitled 
to residual claims, thus creating a bad alignment between their interests and those of the 
firm’s minority shareholders. Since the government is in charge of appointing important 
personnel, and makes the final call on many matters, executives of SOEs in China may be 
more attentive to the government’s demand than safeguarding the interest of individual 
shareholders (Chen et al., 2002).  
 
In addition, the problem of agency may surface as a result of the state being the controlling 
shareholder (Lin and Chen, 1999). Government officials may use state proprietorship as a 
means to create jobs, subsidies, or other benefits as a form of bribery or in exchange for votes 
and support. This allows managers to manipulate financial reports to prevent a decline in 
state fiscal revenue or avoid an embarrassing report that reveals large losses (Tang et al., 
1999). We recall that, in the Mao Zedong era, the Great Leap Forward of 1958-1959 was 
characterized not only by inefficiencies in production but also by grossly overstated 
production figures, the main form of “creative accounting” that occurs in a pure Communist 
system (Han, 1976, p. 131). Finally, state shareholders, either state or state legal persons, 
usually have access to inside information, another factor that reduces the reliability of the 
published financial reports. 
 
2.2 Concentrated Ownership Structure 
La Porta et al. (1998) claim that agency problem is prevalent in many emerging markets, 
where comprehensive legal protection and other governance mechanisms are not in place. 
Wei et al. (2005) consider the agency problem to be particularly serious in China. The 
split-share structure incentivizes majority shareholders at the expense of minority 
shareholders’ interests. Such imbalance exists because corporate insiders enjoy a marked 
separation of voting rights and cash flow rights. A lack of legal protection for external 
shareholders also contributes to the agency problem. As a result, the split-share structure 
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adopted by Chinese corporations has led to ineffective governance of public companies in 
China, which in turn has weakened corporate values. 
 
Previous studies took ownership structure as a variable for corporate governance. Berle and 
Means (1932) investigated the securities markets in the United States and found that 
shareholder supervision is diminished under a decentralized equity structure. When 
proprietors and corporate executives have conflicting goals and face information asymmetries, 
the executives shift their goals from “maximizing shareholder benefits” to “maximizing 
personal wealth.” In such cases, the proprietors will be forced to shoulder a tremendous 
agency cost. Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose the agency theory under the rationale that a 
separation of ownership and management will prevent executives from bearing the full 
burden of the post-decision consequences. In addition, since salaries are the incentive for 
hard work, profit-seeking executives may end up making inefficient decisions or 
compromising proprietors’ interests in pursuit of self-interest. 
 
La Porta et al. (1999) discover that controlling shareholders of numerous publicly listed 
companies use pyramid structure, cross-shareholding, and interlocking directorates to expand 
their control rights beyond their current cash flow rights, and eventually gain total control of 
the company. When controlling shareholders obtain control rights asymmetrical to their 
equities holdings, they are likely to damage other shareholders’ interest by means of quid pro 
quo, hollowing out corporate assets and other activities of similar nature.  
 
Research has been conducted to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and 
corporate performance with differing results. Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose the 
“Convergence-of-Interest Hypothesis,” demonstrating positive correlation between insider 
stock holdings and corporate performance, whereas Fama (1980), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), 
and Mak and Li (2001) show no correlation whatsoever. Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Agrawal 
(1990), and Kang and Shivdasani (1997) propose that the greater the proportion of controlling 
shareholders’ holdings, the better the corporate performance. However, Xiang and Zhang 
(1996) and Steiner (1996) disagree, arguing that the greater the proportion of controlling 
shareholder holdings, the greater the likelihood of those shareholders snatching corporate 
assets, with corporate performance worse off. Nevertheless, another group of scholars 
maintain no correlation between insider stock holdings and corporate performance (Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 1996). 
 
A significant correlation can be found between equity structure and information disclosure. 
La Porta et al. (1999) noticed a negative correlation between the level of ownership 
concentration and the level of accounting disclosure. Chau et al. (2002) pointed out an 
apparent correlation between external ownership and information disclosure. Meanwhile, in 
corporations with a greater proportion of insider holdings and family ownership, the level of 
information disclosure decreases. When corporate shareholder ownership exceeds a certain 
proportion, the majority shareholders tend to take advantage of the company to generate 
personal profits or sacrifice those of the minority shareholders.  
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McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) discover negative correlation between majority 
shareholders and the level of information disclosure. When majority shareholders have 
greater holdings, corporations tend to lower the level of information disclosure and are less 
willing to disclose much information. According to the corporate governance framework of 
the World Bank, majority stockholders are placed under the internal corporate governance. 
Following that line of thinking, majority shareholders’ stock holdings do not facilitate 
corporate governance and information disclosure; quite the opposite, greater holdings of 
majority shareholders may diminish a firm’s willingness to disclose information.  
 
Fan and Wong (2002) study corporate governance and the information content of accounting 
earnings and find that stronger corporate governance has a positive impact on the information 
content of accounting earnings, that is, higher credibility of the company’s financial 
statements. When controlling shareholders increase their control rights by means of pyramid 
structures, cross-holding, and the like, agency problem involving controlling and minority 
shareholders surfaces gradually. Controlling shareholders tend to take self-interested actions 
when disclosing financial information and inevitably lower the credibility of the financial 
statements. As the control rights of controlling shareholders expand, or there is greater 
separation of control rights and cash flow rights, corporate governance deteriorates and the 
information content of accounting earnings is compromised. Transparency and disclosure are 
the basic elements of corporate governance. The campaign themes of glasnost (openness) and 
perestroika (restructuring) used by the reforming last leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail 
Gorbachev, include respectively accounting transparency and economic efficiency in 
production. Higher transparency and disclosure allow corporate stakeholders to gain insight 
into how a company is run and governed. Additionally, accurate and timely information 
disclosure can boost investors’ confidence and create market efficiencies.  
 
As Ball et al. (2000) argue, concentrated ownership increases the likelihood that information 
will be communicated privately to the company’s controlling shareholders. The absence of 
strong information demand in companies with concentrated ownership is unlikely to 
encourage management to provide high quality financial reporting. This situation reduces 
financial transparency and is likely to lead to the expropriation of wealth from minority 
(nongovernment) shareholders. 
 
Moreover, the existence of a high proportion of non-tradable shares implies low contestability 
of control, a situation that can lead to abuses by controlling shareholders as well as long-term 
inefficiencies and poor decisions. Tradable shares generally are held by individuals who have 
few incentives and resources to perform a monitoring function (Tenev et al., 2002). In 
contrast, widely-held companies experience information asymmetry problems between 
managers and shareholders, make more use of financial reporting in contracting and 
communicating, and therefore attract a demand for conservative reporting (Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005). Prior research posits that low ownership concentration or greater 
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proportionate outside shareholder interests encourages a higher level of earnings 
conservatism. The aforementioned literature and inferences lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between the proportion of 
non-tradable shares and earnings conservatism. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Data and Sample Selection 
The sample comprises all publicly-listed nonfinancial companies during the period of 
1994–2003. The empirical analysis begins in 1994 because few observations were available 
before 1994 for the China sample and the relation between earnings and returns in the sample 
was substantially weak.
4
 More pertinently, China adopted a new accounting system in 1993, 
which was adapted to international accounting standards to improve information disclosure. 
After deleting observations with incomplete data and extreme values, the final sample 
consists of 7,353 firm-year observations. All data are collected from the databases of Taiwan 
Economic Journal (TEJ). 
 
3.2 Specification of the Empirical Model 
Following prior studies, Basu’s (1997) conservatism model is used to test hypothesis 
concerned with the difference in the speed with which economic gains and losses are 
captured in accounting earnings. Prior research indicates that earnings conservatism is 
influenced by company-specific attributes like company size, leverage, and profitability (Ball 
and Shivakumar, 2005). This study extends Basu’s (1997) model by incorporating the link 
between earnings conservatism and company-specific attributes. The estimated general model 
is as follows: 
 
tititititititititititi
ti
ti RSIZERDNTARNTARDRD
P
X
6543210
1
 

titititititititititi
RROARDLEVRLEVRDSIZE 10987    
titititi
RDROA   11                                          (1) 
where: 
Xit is the earnings-per-share for company i in year t;  
Pit-1 is the stock price-per-share for company i at t-1; 
Rit is inter-announcement stock returns measured from May of year t to April of year t+1; 
Dit is a dummy variable set equal to one if Rit is negative and zero otherwise;  
NTAit  is comprised of the average of the percentage of state ownership and non-tradable 
shares of company i.  
 
Control variables are defined as follows: 
                                                        
4 There were only 77 observations in the 1993 sample and the earnings response coefficient (ERC) is significantly negative. 
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(1) Company size (SIZE) is the average of the natural logarithm of company i total assets. 
Findings in some prior research indicate that company size strongly influences financial 
transparency (see Jaggi and Low, 2000). Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest the 
political costs hypothesis in positive accounting theory that large companies, subject to 
political costs, may defer reported earnings from current to future periods. However, most 
large corporations in China are SOEs with high state ownership. They tend to diminish 
the demand for promptly disclosing financial information. Consequently, it is expected 
that there will be a negative association between company size and earnings 
conservatism. 
 
(2) Leverage (LEV) is the average of the long-term debt divided by total assets of company i. 
Efficient contracting theory suggests that creditors can mitigate the agency conflicts 
between shareholders and creditors by contracting with companies using financial 
accounting numbers via a debt covenant (Cotter, 1998; Fields et al., 2001; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Earnings conservatism provides contracting parties with an additional 
tool to cope with conflict between debtholders and shareholders (Ahmed et al., 2002; 
Watts, 2003a). Companies with a high level of leverage generally are under greater 
creditor scrutiny to ensure that they do not violate debt covenants (Jaggi and Low, 2000; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Anticipating this risk and substantial losses from aggressive 
accounting, creditors will demand more conservative accounting by setting tight debt 
covenants to minimize expected losses. Ahmed et al. (2002) conclude that companies 
with high leverage tend to adopt conservative accounting to reduce refinancing expenses 
and subsequent costly borrowings or restructuring costs. It may be that lenders prefer to 
actively seek out or impose less onerous restrictions upon companies that adopt 
conservative accounting practices. Although the level of financing provided by banks falls 
as publicly issued debt and equity financing becomes increasingly important, banks are 
the major supplier of funds in China. Hence, Chinese banks are expected to play a 
prominent role in mitigating agency problems by monitoring listed companies and 
encouraging conservative accounting reporting. 
 
(3) Profitability (ROA) is the average of company i return on assets. Profitability also is 
potentially associated with companies’ demands for and cost of conservatism (see Ahmed 
et al., 2002). Companies with higher profitability are expected to use more conservative 
accounting because the cost of making a conservative accounting choice is lower than for 
low-profitability companies. Hence, we include return on assets as a proxy for 
profitability to control for the potential cost of conservatism (Ahmed et al., 2002). In 
addition, including a control for profitability also reduces the likelihood of an 
omitted-variables bias. 
 
Equation (1) posits that using accounting earnings (a lagging variable) as the dependent 
variable and stock returns (a leading variable) as the independent variable estimates the slope 
coefficient better. A bad news dummy Dit is included in the regression to distinguish bad 
news from good news. The slope coefficients β2 and β3 in equation (1) are used to measure 
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the responsiveness of reported earnings to the news captured in contemporaneous returns. 
These slope coefficients are termed “return response coefficients.” The bad news slope 
coefficient is steeper than the good news slope when conservatism exists. Under conservative 
reporting, the slope coefficient β3, which measures the incremental response of earnings to 
bad news over the response to good news, is expected to be positive. coefficient β4 captures 
the marginal effect of sensitivity to bad news for companies where NTAitDit equals zero, and 
the interaction coefficient β5 captures the incremental earnings conservatism for companies 
where NTAitDit equals one. It also is expected that, for conservative reporting, the interaction 
coefficient β5 will be significantly positive. 
 
4. Results  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides the patterns of annual distributions for non-tradable shares for the sample 
period. Overall, SOE reform in China has not resulted in a fundamental change in ownership 
patterns. The ownership structure of listed companies has been relatively stable. For 
non-tradable shares, the annual mean (median), although quite high, decreased slightly from 
61.57% (63.33%) in 1994 to 59.02% (61.11%). This pattern implies that the ownership of 
most Chinese listed companies was not diversified during the sample period. The proportion 
of non-tradable shares is high so only a small portion of these shares are traded in the open 
market. More than half of all shares are non-tradable. Such a high proportion of non-tradable 
shares implies that external monitoring of management probably is deficient, and that there is 
either low demand for earnings conservatism from external user groups or that the demand 
that does exist is not fulfilled. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics for non-tradable shares 
Year n Mean StdDev Min Max 75th Pctl Median 25th Pctl 
1994  249 0.616 0.169 0 0.928 0.725 0.633 0.523 
1995  290 0.605 0.161 0 0.928 0.716 0.621 0.518 
1996  330 0.602 0.155 0 0.928 0.710 0.617 0.516 
1997  568 0.608 0.137 0 0.928 0.708 0.624 0.527 
1998  737 0.607 0.133 0 0.928 0.704 0.625 0.525 
1999  839 0.582 0.147 0 0.928 0.696 0.608 0.502 
2000  934 0.575 0.145 0 0.928 0.684 0.600 0.488 
2001  1089 0.576 0.143 0 0.928 0.683 0.602 0.495 
2002  1114 0.575 0.142 0 0.928 0.681 0.600 0.495 
2003  1203 0.590 0.128 0 0.913 0.682 0.611 0.525 
Total  7353 0.588 0.142 0 0.928 0.694 0.611 0.509 
 
a  
Non-tradable shares (state shares, state legal person shares, domestic legal person shares, foreign capital legal 
person shares, and internal employee shares) for the sample companies that have a full set of available data 
and accounting years falling within the period 1994-2003.  
 
 
Panels A and B of Table 2 report the descriptive statistics for the data used to estimate Basu’s 
(1997) model. The mean (median) annual returns (R) are 0.1218 (-0.0723) with a greater 
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variation over the sample period and a relatively high volatility (the standard deviation is 
0.6743) that is characteristic of emerging markets.
5
 
 
The mean value of earnings variable (NI) is close to zero, having mean (median) and standard 
deviation values of 0.0255 (0.0186) and 0.0789, while the distribution of the NI variable 
tends to decrease over the sample period. Both R and NI are right-skewed (means exceed 
medians), indicating a low level of earnings conservatism for the China sample.
6
 Also, the 
standard deviation of the NI variable always is smaller than the standard deviation of R, 
consistent with Ball et al.’s (2000, p. 12) argument that accounting income is a lagged 
function of past and present years’ stock returns.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for variables 
Panel A: Pooled sample  
 n Mean Median StdDev Min Max 
NI 7353 0.026  0.019 0.079  -0.701  1.756 
R 7353 0.122  -0.072 0.674  -0.862  8.485 
ROA 7353 0.016  0.042 0.337  -3.790  0.377 
LEV 7353 0.458  0.393 1.192  0 72.310 
SIZ 7353 13.793  13.736 0.908  8.910  19.576 
Panel B: Selected years  
Year n 
NI R 
Mean StdDev Mean StdDev 
1994  249 0.128 0.153  -0.064 0.357 
1995  290 0.107 0.163  0.313 0.477 
1996  330 0.071 0.149  1.300 1.115 
1997  568 0.034 0.063  0.015 0.515 
1998  737 0.027 0.066  -0.089 0.429 
1999  839 0.030 0.053  0.758 0.726 
2000  934 0.013 0.040  0.381 0.890 
2001 1089 0.007 0.041  -0.212 0.221 
2002 1114 0.006 0.051  -0.190 0.205 
2003 1203 0.008 0.061  -0.083 0.242 
 
a 
NI (
1/ itit PX ) represents earnings-per-share deflated by price at the beginning of year t. R (Rit) denotes 
inter-announcement stock returns measured from May of year t to April of year t+1. ROA is defined as a 
company’s net income divided by total assets. LEV is the company’s leverage ratio, measured as total debts 
divided by total assets. SIZ is the natural log of a company’s total assets. 
 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
                                                        
5 The standard deviations of both R and NI in the China sample are very similar to the sample in Ball et al. (2000) and to 
those of the four East Asian country samples in Ball et al. (2003). 
6 Ball et al. (2000, p. 12) state that the right skew of earnings indicates accounting conservatism because conservative 
accounting tends to incorporate economic losses as larger but less frequent capitalized amounts and to incorporate economic 
gains as smaller but persistent flows over time. 
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Table 3 provides the Pearson correlation matrix for determinant and proxy variables for 
company-specific institutional factors. As shown in Table 3, the correlations among the 
dependent variables NI and R are significantly correlated (+0.206) as expected, suggesting 
that accounting income does reflect information in companies’ contemporaneous economic 
incomes (Ball et al., 2000). NI also is significantly correlated with profitability (ROA) 
(+0.352), leverage (LEV) (-0.088) and company size (SIZ) (+0.023). Non-tradable shares 
(NTA) is significantly correlated with ROA (+0.025). These correlations indicate that the 
incremental effect of a hypothesized determinant of earnings conservatism should be properly 
identified and explained.
7
 
 
Table 3. Pearson correlation coefficients among variables 
 NI
 
 R
 
 ROA
 
 LEV
 
 SIZ
 
 NTA
 
 
NI
 
 1.000      
R
 
 0.206*** 
(0.000) 
1.000     
ROA 0.352*** 
(0.000) 
0.064*** 
(0.000) 
1.000    
LEV
 
 -0.088*** 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.910) 
-0.305*** 
(0.000) 
1.000   
SIZ
 
 0.065*** 
(0.000) 
-0.028** 
(0.015) 
0.147*** 
(0.000) 
-0.050*** 
(0.000) 
1.000  
NTA
 
 0.011 
(0.360) 
0.005 
(0.642) 
0.026** 
(0.025) 
0.018 
(0.131) 
0.013 
(0.259) 
1.000 
 
a 
Note. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The p-values are in 
parentheses. 
a 
NI (
1/ itit PX ) represents earnings-per-share deflated by price at the beginning of year t. R (Rit) denotes 
inter-announcement stock returns measured from May of year t to April of year t+1. ROA is defined as a 
company’s net income divided by total assets. LEV is the company’s leverage ratio, measured as total debts 
divided by total assets.  SIZ is the natural log of a company’s total assets. NTA is the proportion of a 
company’s non-tradable shares. 
 
4.3 Multivariate Analysis 
Hypothesis of this study states that there is a negative association between the proportion of 
non-tradable shares and earnings conservatism. Table 4 reports the estimation results of 
equation (1). As expected, the interaction coefficients β5 is significantly negative at the 1% 
level (-0.031; t=-2.80). The results support our hypothesis. Specifically, they show that, after 
controlling for company-specific attributes including company size, leverage and profitability, 
companies with higher non-tradable shares have lower earnings conservatism.  
  
                                                        
7 Watts and Zimmerman (1990) and Wong and Wong (2001) discuss and explain the problems that emerge in empirical 
research within the positive accounting tradition when “correlated omitted variables” are not properly identified and 
controlled for. 
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Table 4. Regression result of earnings conservatism 
 
tititititititititititi
ti
ti RSIZERDNTARNTARDRD
P
X
6543210
1
 

titititititititititi
RROARDLEVRLEVRDSIZE 10987    
titititi
RDROA   11                                         (1) 
 
Variables Pred.Sign Coef. t-Stat. 
INTERCEPT ? 0.036***  22.84 
D ? -0.001***  -3.67 
R - -0.101***  -4.94 
D*R + 0.223***  2.99 
NTA*R ? 0.002 0.15 
NTA*R*D -  -0.031*** -2.80 
SIZE*R ? 0.007*** 4.87 
SIZE*R*D -  -0.010* -1.91 
LEV*R ?  -0.003*** -5.77 
LEV*R*D +  0.001  0.21 
ROA*R ?  0.462*** 25.99 
ROA*R*D +  0.611*** 31.37 
    
F value  131.07***  
Adj.R
2
(%)  18.70  
No. of obs  7353  
a
 Note. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
b 
1/ itit PX  is company i’s earnings-per-share deflated by the price at the beginning of the year t; Rit is company 
i’s compounded monthly return over the 12-month period. D is a dummy variable for bad news, code one if Rit is 
negative; and zero otherwise. NTA is the proportion of a company’s non-tradable shares. SIZ is the natural log of 
a company’s total assets. LEV is the company’s leverage ratio, measured as total debts divided by total assets. 
ROA is defined as a company’s net income divided by total assets. 
  
Furthermore, as demonstrated in prior studies, institutional factors are associated with agency 
conflicts, particularly those arising from information asymmetry, so they create different 
levels of demand for earnings conservatism (Watts, 2003b). As expected, we find that the 
incremental effects of profitability (+0.611; t=31.37) and company size (-0.010; t=-1.91) on 
earnings conservatism are significant with predicted sign. However, although the direction is 
as predicted, the interaction of leverage (+0.001; t=0.21) is not significant. This last result 
may be because banks, which are government-owned, also do not demand earnings 
conservatism. 
 
4.4 Alternative Model of Earnings Conservatism by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) 
To check for the robustness of our results, we also apply the alternative empirical model of 
earnings conservatism developed by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) to test our hypothesis. Ball 
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and Shivakumar (2005) measure earnings conservatism as the asymmetric timeliness of 
accruals in economic loss recognition relative to economic gain recognition. They use 
operating cash flows to proxy for economic losses and gains during the year. We extend the 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model by incorporating the link between earnings conservatism 
and company-specific attributes to test our hypotheses as follows: 
 
titititititiit
CFONTACFOCFODCFOCFODACC 43210    
titititititititi
CFOCFODSIZECFOSIZECFOCFODNTA 765  
tititititititi
CFOROACFOCFODLEVCFOLEV 1098    
titititi
CFOCFODROA   11                                    (2) 
where 
ACCi is the mean of total accruals of company i multiplied by -1 and standardized by 
beginning period total assets. Accruals are defined as earnings before exceptional 
items and extra-ordinary items minus cash from operations; 
CFOit   is operating cash in year t dividend by beginning total assets; 
CFODit   is a dummy variable set equal to one if CFOit is negative and zero otherwise. 
 
The result of equation (2) is given in Table 5. The results based on the model of Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) are largely consistent with our findings documented above. The 
interaction coefficients β5 is significantly negative at the 1% level (-0.709; t=-2.60). Again, 
they show that Chinese companies with higher non-tradable shares supply less earnings 
conservatism. Therefore, hypothesis is supported, using an alternative empirical model of 
earnings conservatism.  
 
As expected, we find that the incremental effects of profitability (+3.401; t=12.42) and 
company size (-0.250; t=-2.23) on earnings conservatism are significant with the predicted 
sign. However, the interaction of leverage (+0.168; t=1.64) is statistically different from zero.  
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Table 5. Regression result of alternative model of earnings conservatism 
 
titititititiit
CFONTACFOCFODCFOCFODACC 43210    
titititititititi
CFOCFODSIZECFOSIZECFOCFODNTA 765  
tititititititi
CFOROACFOCFODLEVCFOLEV 1098    
titititi
CFOCFODROA   11                                (2) 
 
Variables Pred.Sign Coef. t-Stat. 
INTERCEPT ? 0.009***  3.11 
CFOD ? 0.012**  2.36 
CFO + 0.030  0.30 
CFOD*CFO + 0.391**  2.54 
NTA*CFO ? 0.231 1.48 
NTA*CFO*CFOD -  -0.709*** -2.60 
SIZE*CFO ?  -0.011 -1.03 
SIZE*CFO*CFOD -  -0.250** -2.23 
LEV*CFO ?  -0.158* -1.78 
LEV*CFO*CFOD +  0.168 1.64 
ROA*CFO ?  -2.990*** -11.20 
ROA*CFO*CFOD +  3.401*** 12.42 
    
F value  36.56***  
Adj.R
2
(%)  12.61  
No. of obs  2264  
a
 Note. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
b 
ACCit is he mean of total accruals of company i multiplied by -1 and standardized by beginning period total 
assets.; CFOit cash from operations in year t standardized by beginning period total assets. D is a dummy 
variable for bad news, code one if CFOit is negative; and zero otherwise. NTA is the proportion of a company’s 
non-tradable shares. SIZ is the natural log of a company’s total assets. LEV is the company’s leverage ratio, 
measured as total debts divided by total assets. ROA is defined as a company’s net income divided by total 
assets. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Summarizing, the findings demonstrate an important link between the corporate ownership 
structure for Chinese listed companies and earnings conservatism. Consistent with Bushman 
and Piotroski (2006) and LaFond (2005), these results indicate that earnings conservatism 
decreases with the presence of higher levels of non-tradable shares. Companies with state and 
concentrated ownership structures are more likely to depend on private communication to 
reduce information asymmetry and resolve agency problems internally, thereby creating low 
demand for earnings conservatism. Furthermore, the regression results show that companies 
with smaller size and higher profitability report more conservatively. 
 
Collectively, the evidence in this study shows consistently that differences in earnings 
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conservatism arise from differential information demands. More specifically, the level of 
earnings conservatism is an equilibrium outcome of forces set in motion by market 
participants acting in their own self-interest, and reflecting differences in demand for 
conservative financial reporting. Accounting reporting practices for Chinese companies are 
focused more often on meeting the needs of the major shareholder (i.e. the Chinese 
Communist Party) rather than the needs of investors.  
 
China has been undergoing a guided transition from a planned economy to a market-oriented 
economy but the market economy remains under the ultimate control of the Communist Party. 
We simply have a longer and deeper version of Lenin’s New Economic Policy and, although 
many do get rich, Communist social relationships and expectations still largely predominate 
(Zinoviev, 1985). This is especially the case when we consider the higher levels of power 
within organizations. We recall that China started its reform efforts in the late-1970s under 
Deng Xiaoping in an environment where few elements of a well functioning financial market 
were in place. The evidence shows that China’s institutional transition is far from complete 
and will remain incomplete as long as preserving the dominant involvement of government 
remains the overriding objective of those in power. In such an environment, the demand for 
conservatism by minority shareholders remains less important and unlikely to be adequately 
met. This may or may not trouble Westerners and other non-Chinese used to a free-market 
system of the conventional type where capitalist business relationships are the norm.  
 
In 2005, the China Securities Regulatory Commission announced an initiative to convert 
non-tradable shares into tradable shares. The new initiative (called “Administrative Measures 
on the Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies”) provides ground rules to allow for 
the conversion of the shares. Many investors and analysts view this as a significant reform 
that will continue to shift the balance of share ownership from state ownership to public 
ownership by minority shareholders. Future research may investigate the effectiveness of this 
split-share structure reform and examine whether the diffused ownership structure affects the 
attitudes of management and demands of stakeholders for earnings conservatism. 
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